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TIME AND THE COURTS:
WHAT DEADLINES AND THEIR TREATMENT
TELL US ABOUT THE LITIGATION SYSTEM
Catherine T. Struve*

INTRODUCTION

A judicial-conduct inquiry is currently underway concerning a failed
attempt by attorneys for a death row inmate to make an after-hours
emergency filing with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. According to charges filed with the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct,
the facts of the incident include the following: Michael Wayne Richard's execution was set for 6:00 PM on September 25, 2007.1 On the
morning of the 25th, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Baze v. Rees, which presented questions concerning the constitutionality of execution by lethal injection, 2 the method that would be used in
Richard's case. 3 Judges of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals were
aware of the grant of certiorari in Baze and an email was circulated to
4
them discussing the possibility of a filing from Richard's lawyers.
* Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School. I thank the participants in an ad hoc
workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Law School for their thoughtful comments during
the initial stages of my research, and Edward Cooper, Shari Diamond, Stephan Landsman, and
the participants in the 15th Annual Clifford Symposium for their very helpful comments on a
draft of this Article. I am grateful to Ronald Day of the Biddle Law Library for his assistance in
finding sources and to Melinda Harris for her excellent research assistance. Although I served
as reporter to a subcommittee of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure that developed proposed amendments to the national time-computation rules (Federal Rule of Civil Procedure [hereinafter Civil Rule] 6(a), Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
[hereinafter Criminal Rule] 45(a), Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure [hereinafter Bankruptcy Rule] 9006(a), and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure [hereinafter Appellate Rule]
26(a)), the views expressed here are solely my own.
1. See First Amended Notice of Formal Proceedings, Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 96,
Before the State Commission on Judicial Conduct [hereinafter First Amended Notice], 7; The
Honorable Sharon Keller's Verified Answer to the First Amended Notice of Formal Proceedings
of the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct and Special Exception [hereinafter Answer
to First Amended Notice], 4.
2. See Baze v. Rees, 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 2007), cert. granted, 551 U.S. 1192 (Sept. 25, 2007)
(No. 07-5439).
3. See First Amended Notice, supra note 1, 1 14; The Honorable Sharon Keller's Trial Brief,
Inquiry Concerning a Judge, No. 96, Before the State Commission on Judicial Conduct [hereinafter Trial Brief] at 6-7.
4. See First Amended Notice, supra note 1, 16; Trial Brief, supra note 3, at 7-8 (suggesting
that the email could have been understood to refer to an expected filing in the trial court).
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Richard's legal team, however, experienced computer problems and

called the clerk's office shortly before 5:00 PM to request that it accept
the filing after 5:00 PM. 5 The court's general counsel contacted Judge
Sharon Keller, the Presiding Judge, to ask how to respond to the request. 6 Judge Keller has stated that she "understood [the general
counsel's question] to refer to whether the clerk's office stayed open

past 5:00 PM," a question to which she "said no in accordance with
state law and . . . long standing custom."' 7 No stay was granted in
Richard's case, and he was executed later that evening. 8

It is not evident that the Court of Criminal Appeals would have
granted Richard a stay of execution; the court apparently denied another death row inmate's similar request. 9 But that inmate, Carlton
Akee Turner-having obtained a ruling on the merits from the Court
of Criminal Appeals-was able to seek and obtain a stay of execution

from the U.S. Supreme Court. 10 It also remains to be determined precisely why Richard's lawyers were unable to employ Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.2(a)(2), which provides that documents may be
filed with "a justice or judge of that court who is willing to accept
delivery."1 1 Another judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals had
been assigned to be in charge of any proceedings in connection with

5. See First Amended Notice, supra note 1, 18; Answer to First Amended Notice, supra note
1, 1 14(Q); id. T 14(T) (asserting that "[i]t is still not clear whether" Richard's lawyers were, "in
fact, encountering computer problems on that day but in any event the motion to stay based on
the Baze case was a simple document"); Trial Brief, supra note 3, at 8.
6. See First Amended Notice, supra note 1, 1 19.
7. Answer to First Amended Notice, supra note 1, 1 9. The state law referenced in Judge
Keller's Answer is Section 658.005 of the Texas Government Code. Presumably Judge Keller
meant to refer to Section 658.005(a), which provides in part that "[n]ormal office hours of a state
agency are from 8 a.m. to 5 PM, Monday through Friday. These hours are the regular working
hours for a full-time state employee." Section 658.005(b) provides, "If a chief administrator of a
state agency considers it necessary or advisable, offices also may be kept open during other
hours and on other days, and the time worked counts toward the 40 hours a week that are
required under Section 658.002."
8. Answer to First Amended Notice, supra note 1, 1 10.
9. First Amended Notice, supra note 1, 9 28.
10. See Miscellaneous Order, Turner v. Texas, stay granted, 551 U.S. 1193 (Sept. 27, 2007) (No.
07A272) ("Application for stay . . . granted pending the timely filing and disposition of the
petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied, this stay shall
terminate automatically."). Ultimately, in April 2008, a fractured U.S. Supreme Court denied
relief to the petitioners in Baze. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1526 (2008). Soon thereafter,
the Court denied Turner's petition for certiorari, thus vacating the stay of his execution. See
Turner v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 2052 (2008).
11. See Trial Brief, supra note 3, at 8 (stating that Richard's lawyers had previously used Rule
9.2(a)(2) to make an after-hours stay request in another death penalty case).

2010]

TIME AND THE COURTS

Richard's execution, and that judge stayed at court after hours on the
13
25th; 12 but Richard's attorneys did not make a filing with that judge.
I open with this incident in part because it provides an extreme example of the importance of deadlines and their interpretation: Deadlines and their implications for access to courts can truly have life or
death consequences. I do not present the Richard case as representative of practice in the Texas court system. Nor does that approach
reflect the practice in federal courts, which typically have systems in
place to receive emergency filings in capital cases after normal business hours. 14 Indeed, the federal courts are, by statute, "deemed always open" to receive filings, although in practice, that statute should
15
only be invoked in the most exigent circumstances.
12. See id. at 9 (asserting that the assigned judge, the general counsel, "and several other
members of the Court were at the CCA after hours" that day "and were willing to accept filings," and that the assigned judge was at the court until "shortly before" Richard's execution).
13. The amended charges filed in mid-June 2009 assert that "neither [the assigned judge] nor
the other judges who remained at the Court after 5 Pm were aware that Mr. Richard's lawyers
had called to ask whether filings after 5 PM could be accepted." First Amended Notice, supra
note 1, 22. However, Judge Keller's trial brief, filed in mid-August 2009, asserts that the general counsel told the assigned judge "[alt approximately 5:00 Pm . . . about the call from Mr.
Richard's lawyers asking that the Clerk's office remain open after 5:00 Pm" Trial Brief, supra
note 3, at 10.
14. See, e.g., 2D CIR. R. § 0.28(7)(i) ("During non-business hours, emergency stay applications
must be directed to an assigned representative of the Clerk (the duty clerk), whose telephone
number is left with the courthouse security officers. The duty clerk must immediately advise the
members of the assigned panel of the filing of an emergency stay application."). As 2D CIR. R.
0.28(j) states,
In the event the members of the assigned panel cannot be reached by the duty clerk,
the duty clerk advises the judge of the court assigned at that time to hear emergency
applications of the filing of an off-hours emergency stay application. Notwithstanding
the provisions of subparagraphs 7(e) and 7(g)(ii), the applications judge may stay an
execution until such time as the application can be placed before the assigned panel or
the Court in banc.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 452 (2006) states in part, "All courts of the United States shall be deemed
always open for the purpose of filing proper papers, issuing and returning process, and making
motions and orders." The national rules of procedure for the federal courts contain similar provisions. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 5001(a); FED. R. Civ. P. 77(a); FED. R. CRIM. P. 56(a); FED. R.
APP. P. 45(a)(2). Some courts have interpreted these provisions to permit litigants to make
filings after court hours by seeking out a court official and handing the filing to that official in
person. See, e.g., Casalduc v. Diaz, 117 F.2d 915, 917 (1st Cir. 1941) (citing Civil Rule 77(a) for
the principle that "[a] person wishing to file a notice of appeal after closing hours on the last day
may seek out the clerk or deputy clerk, or perhaps the judge ... , and deliver the notice to him
out of hours. The notice of appeal would then be filed within the statutory period."); McIntosh
v. Antonino, 71 F.3d 29, 35 n.5 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Casalduc for the proposition that "[a]fter
hours, papers can validly be filed by in-hand delivery to the clerk or other proper official";
noting that "some clerks' offices reportedly have established so-called 'night depositories' to
accommodate after-hours filings"; and declining to decide whether an item is filed at the time it
is placed in such a depository after hours). Admittedly, § 452's history does not suggest that the
statute was designed to address the accessibility of the courts for emergency filings. In nineteenth-century treatises, predecessor provisions are sometimes mentioned in the course of dis-
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My broader point is that such questions illuminate not only the
treatment of deadlines, but also various assumptions concerning the
litigation process more generally. The principle that federal courts are
always open, even if only for true emergencies, might relate to a number of facts about the modern federal courts: that they are the courts
of last resort for capital petitioners; on a different note, that federal
judges routinely work beyond business hours on weekdays and also on
weekends; 16 and, on a still different note, that with the advent of elec-

tronic filing, the federal courts are in fact always open both to receive
t7
and provide documents.

These reflections suggest the thesis of this Article: examining the
treatment of court deadlines can help to reveal how participants in the
litigation system view their own roles and how they view the roles of
cussions concerning the terms of court and sometimes during discussions of jurisdiction. See,
e.g., HORACE ANDREWS, MANUAL OF THE LAWS AND COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND OF
THE SEVERAL STATES AND TERRITORIES 9 (1873) (in a section entitled "Terms of the Courts of
the United States," noting that "[t]he circuit courts, as courts of equity, are always open for the
purpose of filing pleadings, issuing and returning process and commissions, and for interlocutory
proceedings"); ROBERT DESTY, A MANUAL OF PRACTICE IN THE COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 51 (5th ed. 1881) (section entitled "Courts always open for certain purposes" listed
under the topic heading "Circuit Courts-Jurisdiction"); GEORGE W. FIELD, A TREATISE ON
THE CONSTITUTION AND JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES

146 (Phila., T. &

J.W. Johnson & Co. 1883) (discussing the fact that "circuit courts ... are always open" in a
chapter on jurisdiction). Both contexts suggest that the purpose of courts-always-open provisions was to address the power of the courts to act. See JOHN M. GOULD & GEORGE F. TUCKER,
NOTES ON THE REVISED

STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES

89 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co.

1889) (observing that "while common-law judges properly exercise their authority only when
holding a court, and have no power to sit in vacation, yet courts of equity are always open, the
chancellor's authority being personal ... and capable of exercise equally in term time and in
vacation"). This was, likewise, the view taken in a House report concerning the 1948 legislation
that codified the present 28 U.S.C. § 452. See H.R. REP. No. 80-308, at A52 (1947). But even if
§ 452 was not originally designed to embody the principle of openness to emergency filings, the
statute can be read to support such a principle. It is not a principle that should be overused.
Judges are most unlikely to wish to receive personal visits at home from litigants seeking to
make emergency filings- indeed, such a practice would raise security concerns. Provisions that
designate some other court official as the point of contact seem well-advised. But apart from
these practicalities, there is appeal to the general principle that courts should always be open for
the purpose of addressing truly exigent circumstances.
16. See, e.g., Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: JudicialAdaptations to Caseload, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 3, 8 (reporting the results of a survey of federal trial judges, including the fact
that "most reported routinely working 10-14 hours each weekday, as well as part of each weekend"); id. at 39 (reporting the results of a survey of federal appellate judges and noting that
"[m]ost of the judges reported they coped with caseload by working longer and harder").
17. See Public Access to Court Electronic Records Overview, http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov/
pacerdesc.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2010). Under a pilot program, the files available electronically through PACER will include not only written documents, but also audiorecordings of some
court proceedings, a feature that further increases the courts' accessibility. See Press Release,
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Pilot Project Begins: Two Courts Offer Digital Audio Recordings Online (Aug. 6, 2007), http://www.uscourts.govPressReleases/digialaudio08O6O7.html (last
visited Jan. 19, 2010).
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others. Deadlines and their proper application form a vital topic in
their own right. However, in this Article, I propose to examine what
litigation deadlines tell us about the way in which key actors in the
litigation system relate to one another. My brief survey is meant to be
impressionistic rather than comprehensive, addressing three overarching themes: how courts relate to Congress, how judges relate to parties
and their lawyers, and how lawyers relate to one another.
Part II addresses legislature-court relations. 18 It first notes the
ongoing debate-exemplified by cases such as Bowles v. Russell 9over the nature of statutory deadlines. 20 It then discusses a rare subset of such deadlines, namely, those limiting the time for the court's
own action. 21 It suggests that although courts take such deadlines seriously and are diligent in complying with them, Congress should correlatively ensure that it considers the practicalities of judging when
weighing the adoption of such time limits as a means of furthering
policy. Part III suggests that judges, likewise, should consider the
practicalities of lawyering when they interpret and apply litigation
deadlines. It first notes the systemic concerns that support the enforcement of deadlines generally, and it then discusses the factors that
courts consider when deciding whether to extend a deadline in a particular case. Part IV briefly notes that the treatment of deadlines also
illuminates our understanding of how lawyers relate to one another as
colleagues, as litigation allies, and as opponents.
II.

COURTS AND LEGISLATURES

Among the thousands of deadlines that might come into play in federal litigation, there exist hundreds set by statute. The fact that a particular deadline is set by statute is significant. As Section A discusses,
sometimes that fact is dispositive, as when a court concludes that a
deadline, because it is set by statute, is non-waivable and impervious
to equitable exceptions. 22 Although this Article will not attempt to
survey completely the intricate doctrine on such questions, it will suggest that it is useful, when applying a statutory deadline, to consider
statutory purpose. 23 The mere fact that Congress has set a deadline in
statutory form should not necessarily cast that deadline as jurisdictional; a more nuanced account should take notice of the legislation's
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See
551
See
See
See
See

infra text accompanying notes 22-132.
U.S. 205 (2007).
infra text accompanying notes 27-45.
infra text accompanying notes 46-132.
infra note 30 and accompanying text.
infra text accompanying note 45.
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goals. 24 Section B examines a small subset of statutory deadlines: instances in which Congress sets a deadline not for litigants' action but
for action by the court.2 5 Section B discusses a few recent examples,
noting that while such provisions may serve important legislative
goals, they should be carefully crafted with an eye to the realities of
26
judges' work.
A.

The Nature of Deadlines in Federal Litigation

No survey of the law of federal litigation deadlines is complete without a discussion of Bowles v. Russell,27 so I will begin by examining
what that case and some others in its line have to say about the nature
of litigation deadlines in federal court. I will not discuss this question
at length, both because it has been so much discussed elsewhere 28 and
because the law in this area is still developing. However, a brief analysis is in order because Bowles emphasizes that appeal deadlines set
by statute are for that reason jurisdictional. 29 And that emphasis on
statutes implicates the topic I discuss in this Part, namely, the relationship between the courts and Congress.
24. See id.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 46-132.
26. See id.
27. 551 U.S. 205 (2007).
28. See, e.g., Scott Dodson, Jurisdictionalityand Bowles v. Russell, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 42, 47 (2007) (arguing that instead of holding the fourteen-day deadline in 28 U.S.C. § 2107
to be jurisdictional, the Supreme Court should have held it to be "mandatory but nonjurisdictional"); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nonjurisdictionalityor Inequity, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 64, 65 (2007) (responding to Dodson's proposal); Perry Dane, Sad Time: Thoughts on
Jurisdictionality,the Legal Imagination, and Bowles v. Russell, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
164, 164 (2007) (contending "that time limits can ... be jurisdictional without being interpreted
literally and peremptorily"); E. King Poor, The Jurisdictional Time Limit for an Appeal: The
Worst Kind of Deadline-Exceptfor All Others, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 151, 151-52
(2007) ("[P]ractical experience teaches that the judicial system as a whole works far better-with
greater stability and overall fairness-when the time for an appeal cannot be manipulated by the
parties or overridden by the trial court and thus is treated as jurisdictional."); Scott Dodson,
Appreciating Mandatory Rules: A Reply to Critics, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 228, 238
(2008) (responding to Dane, Poor, and Burch); Scott Dodson, The Failure of Bowles v. Russell,
43 TULSA L. REV. 631, 632 (2008) (arguing that Bowles "leaves lower courts and litigants to
wonder whether statutory limits in other areas can be waived or excused for equitable reasons,
or whether they could come back to unravel the entire case for the first time on appeal"); Howard Wasserman, Jurisdiction,Merits, and Procedure: Thoughts on Dodson's Trichotomy, 102 Nw.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 215, 222 (2008) (considering possible implications of the Court's discussion of Bowles in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 552 U.S. 130 (2008)); Christopher
W. Robbins, Comment, Jurisdiction and the FederalRules: Why the Time Has Come to Reform
Finalityby Inequitable Deadlines, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 284 (2008) (arguing that "[tihe combination of a presumption that a requirement is nonjurisdictional with an extension of principles of
equity into the area of post-trial motions and notices of appeal would allow for a more just
procedure for challenging a judgment").
29. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210-12.
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The nature of a litigation deadline-i.e., whether the deadline is jurisdictional-is important in at least two circumstances: first, when the
litigant's opponent fails to complain about the failure to meet the
deadline, and second, when the failure to meet the deadline is raised
but the litigant offers as an excuse for noncompliance some extraordinary circumstance-in particular, reliance on misinformation from the
court. In such instances, a nonjurisdictional deadline might not be enforced either because the opponent waived the untimeliness objection
or because the litigant offers a sufficiently good excuse for noncompliance. But a jurisdictional deadline must be raised by the court sua
sponte and cannot be softened by judicially created exceptions such as
30
the "unique circumstances" doctrine.
Just a few years ago, it seemed that the Supreme Court was inclined
to narrow the range of litigation deadlines that it deemed "jurisdictional." In Kontrick v. Ryan, the Court held that the time limit set by
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (Bankruptcy Rule) 4004 for
objections by creditors was not jurisdictional. 3 1 The Kontrick Court
suggested that "[c]larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants
used the label 'jurisdictional' not for claim-processing rules, but only
for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's
adjudicatory authority. ' 32 Likewise, a year later, in Eberhartv. United
States, the Court concluded that the seven-day time limit for certain
new trial motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (Crimi33
nal Rule) 33 was nonjurisdictional.
But the Court took a different direction in Bowles. That case involved a habeas petitioner who sought leave to reopen the time to
appeal on the ground that he had not received notice of the entry of
the judgment. 34 Under both Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
(Appellate Rule) 4(a)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c), the district court
had the authority to reopen the appeal time, but only for a period of
fourteen days.3 5 Unfortunately for Bowles, the district court's order
granting the request specified that the notice of appeal could be filed
on or before February 27, 2004-a day that fell, as it turned out, sev36
enteen rather than fourteen days after the entry of the court's order.
30. See 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
at 203-05 (4th ed. 2008).
31. Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 452 (2004).
32. Id. at 455.
33. Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19 (2005).
34. Bowles v. Russell, 432 F.3d 668, 670 (6th Cir. 2005).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c); FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).
36. See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 207 (2007).

AND PROCEDURE §

3950.1,
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The U.S. Supreme Court held that the notice of appeal, filed on February 26, was untimely and that the untimeliness constituted a jurisdictional defect. 37 Accordingly, the Bowles majority held that the
lateness could not be excused by Bowles's reliance on a date that the
38
district court miscalculated.
The Bowles Court distinguished Kontrick and Eberhartby stressing
that those cases did not involve deadlines set by statute. As the Court
explained,
Jurisdictional treatment of statutory time limits makes good sense.
Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have jurisdiction to consider. Because Congress decides
whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine
when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them. Put
another way, the notion of "subject-matter" jurisdiction obviously
extends to "classes of cases ... falling within a court's adjudicatory
authority," but it is no less "jurisdictional" when Congress forbids
of
federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate "class
39
cases" after a certain period has elapsed from final judgment.
In the context of appeal deadlines, Bowles has produced a few discernible trends and one nascent circuit split. The lower courts are in
consensus that statutory appeal deadlines are, under Bowles, jurisdictional. 40 And the trend in the caselaw is to treat appeal deadlines that
41
are set only by rule and not by statute as non-jurisdictional. Complications have arisen, however, with respect to appeal-related deadlines
that are hybrids-i.e., deadlines that are set partly by rule and partly
by statute. For example, the Civil Rules set deadlines for making
postjudgment motions that toll the time to appeal in a civil case; 42 the
tolling motion deadlines are purely rule-based, but the appeal deadlines tolled by such motions are statutory. Are the motion deadlines
jurisdictional because they toll statutory appeal deadlines, or nonjurisdictional because they themselves are nonstatutory? To date, three
43
circuits have answered this question, each in a different way.
37. Id. at 208.
38. Id. at 206-07.
39. Id. at 212-13 (internal citations omitted).
40. See, e.g., Marandola v. United States, 518 F.3d 913, 914 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Byfield, 522 F.3d 400, 403 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
42. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(i)-(vi) (listing motions that toll appeal time in civil cases).
43. See United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 513 F.3d 1085, 1101 & n.37 (9th
Cir. 2008) (holding that tolling-motion deadlines are jurisdictional, at least to the extent that the
motions are to have a tolling effect), reh'g en banc granted, 545 F.3d 1106 (9th Cit. 2008) (stating
that "[t]he three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent by or to any court of the
Ninth Circuit"), opinion on reh'g en banc 579 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (adopting
panel's reasoning on the issue of tolling-motion deadlines); Dill v. Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co., 525
F.3d 612, 618-19 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that the Civil Rule 50(b) deadline is nonjurisdictional,
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Of course, although the questions raised by Bowles may extend beyond the field of appeal deadlines to many other litigation deadlines,
it cannot be true that all statutory litigation deadlines are jurisdictional simply because they are set by statute. Statutes of limitation,
for instance, are ordinarily treated as affirmative defenses; they are
thus waivable, and therefore nonjurisdictional. But statutes of limitations for certain types of claims may be subject to special treatment.
For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court recently held in John R. Sand &
Gravel Co. v. United States that the Court of Federal Claims' six-year
limitation period is jurisdictional. 44 In so doing, the Court suggested
that the nature of the limitations period may be discerned by reference to the provision's purposes:
Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect defendants
against stale or unduly delayed claims. Thus, the law typically treats
a limitations defense as an affirmative defense that the defendant
must raise at the pleadings stage and that is subject to rules of forfeiture and waiver. Such statutes also typically permit courts to toll
the limitations period in light of special equitable considerations.
Some statutes of limitations, however, seek not so much to protect a defendant's case-specific interest in timeliness as to achieve a
broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the administration
of claims, limiting the scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign
immunity, or promoting judicial efficiency. The Court has often
read the time limits of these statutes as more absolute, say as requiring a court to decide a timeliness question despite a waiver, or as
equitable consideraforbidding a court to consider whether certain
45
tions warrant extending a limitations period.
The John R. Sand Court's emphasis on the purposes of the statutory
period suggests a useful refinement of the reasoning of Bowles. One
might question whether, in all instances, a statutory provision is meant
to set a jurisdictionaldeadline that is non-waivable and impervious to
equitable exceptions. Sometimes legislators may indeed intend to
limit the power of courts to forgive untimeliness, but in other instances, the legislators' intent might be consistent with a contrary
interpretation.

but holding that when the other party objected to the motion's untimeliness before the court
decided the motion but after the nontolled appeal time ran out, the appeal must be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction); Nat'l Ecological Found. v. Alexander, 496 F.3d 466, 475-76 (6th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the Civil Rule 59(e) deadline is nonjurisdictional).
44. 128 S.Ct. 750, 755 (2008).
45. Id. at 753 (internal citations omitted).

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

610
B.

[Vol. 59:601

Deadlines for Judicial Action

Such interpretive questions also arise in connection with statutory
litigation deadlines that set time limits on action by the court itself.
The notion of tight deadlines on certain types of court action is, of
course, not new. In civil cases, for example, the Civil Rules have long
set a presumption that a temporary restraining order (TRO) will expire after a very short time period. 46 This limit, which in effect requires either the TRO's expiration or its conversion (after a hearing)
into a preliminary injunction, is a necessary safeguard in light of the
fact that TROs can be obtained ex parte. 47 In criminal cases, both the
Constitution 48 and implementing statutes4 9 guarantee a speedy trial,
therefore requiring prompt judicial action.5 0 But the implementing
statutes take account of the practicalities of litigation by listing a number of time periods that are excluded from Speedy Trial Act
51
calculations.
During the past fifteen years, Congress has made a number of notable additions to the list of time limits on federal court action.5 2 For
example, in the mid-1990s Congress enacted both the Antiterrorism
46. Civil Rule 65(b)(2) provides in part, "The order expires at the time after entry-not to
exceed 10 days-that the court sets, unless before that time the court, for good cause, extends it
for a like period or the adverse party consents to a longer extension."
47. See French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 443 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Both the 10-day limit on
TROs found in Rule 65(b) and the analogous limit in the Norris-LaGuardia Act respond to the
particular problems of ex parte proceedings."), rev'd on othergrounds sub nor. Miller v. French,
530 U.S. 327 (2000).
48. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

49. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (2006); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) ("The court may dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint if unnecessary delay occurs in: (1) presenting a
charge to a grand jury; (2) filing an information against a defendant; or (3) bringing a defendant
to trial."); FED. R. CRIM. P. 50 ("Scheduling preference must be given to criminal proceedings as
far as practicable.").
50. See generally 3B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 813 (3d ed.) (2004) (discussing protections for defendant's right to a speedy trial).
51. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h) (2006); see also French, 178 F.3d at 444 (noting that the Speedy
Trial Act "contains a long list of exceptions").
52. In addition to the statutes discussed in the text, examples include the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005); the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005); the Crime
Victims' Rights Act, Pub. L. 108-405, § 102(a), 118 Stat. 2260, 2261 (2004); and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, § 101(a)-(b), 109 Stat. 737, 744 (1995). For
an example of the effects of CAFA's deadlines, see In re U-Haul Int'l, Inc., No. 08-7122, 2009
WL 902414, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2009) (Rogers, J., dissenting from denial of petition for leave
to appeal) (reasoning that removal jurisdiction under CAFA depended in U-Haul on the unsettled question of "whether D.C. law permits a plaintiff to bring a claim on behalf of the general
public as a non-class representative action," and concluding that "CAFA's time limitations on
appellate review prevent this court from certifying the question" to the D.C. Court of Appeals).
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and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) 53 and the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). 54 In these statutes, the time limits on
court action seem to serve a general statutory goal of reorienting the
role of the federal courts: in AEDPA, by limiting federal court delay
in reviewing certain capital cases, and in the PLRA, by limiting federal court delay in reassessing the appropriateness of existing injunctions concerning prison conditions. Short time limits on court action
may require courts to alter their priorities, and they may limit courts'
ability to thoroughly consider the merits of a given matter. Although
the statutory time limits discussed here have not been invalidated on
constitutional grounds, they do raise questions at a policy level.
Both AEDPA and the PLRA illustrate the use of deadlines on
court action as a tool for altering the role of the federal courts.
AEDPA establishes a fast-track procedure for the review of habeas
petitions of state prisoners who have been sentenced to death by the
courts of a qualifying state. 55 To qualify for the application of the fasttrack procedures, the state must obtain a certification by the United
States Attorney General that the state "has established a mechanism
for the appointment, compensation, and payment of reasonable litigation expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceedings brought by indigent prisoners who have been sentenced to
death," and that "the State provides standards of competency for the
appointment of counsel" in such proceedings. 56 For the first decade of
its existence, the fast-track qualification procedure involved a somewhat similar standard 57 concerning the provision of counsel on state
collateral review, but it did not involve a certification by the Attorney
General. During that period, it appears that no court actually applied
the fast-track procedures to a state habeas petitioner. 58 In 2006, Congress amended the statute to make the substantive standard less stringent and to vest the certification authority in the Attorney General. 5 9
53. Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
54. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
55. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261-2266.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 2265(a)(1)(A), (C) (2006).
57. Under the current standard, the counsel appointed for collateral state proceedings cannot
be the same counsel who represented the defendant at trial unless both the lawyer and the
prisoner expressly so choose. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261(d). The pre-2006 standard went further, presumptively ruling out (as collateral-proceeding counsel) any lawyer who had represented the
prisoner in the direct appeal. See Pub. L. 104-132, § 107(a), 110 Stat. 1221 (enacting original
version of 28 U.S.C. § 2261(d)).
58. See John H. Blume, AEDPA: The "Hype" and the "Bite", 91 CORNELL L. REv. 259,
274-75 (2006).
59. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§ 2265, 120 Stat. 192, 250.
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The Department of Justice (DOJ) issued implementing regulations in
December 2008.60 However, a legal aid organization sued to challenge the sufficiency of the notice that the DOJ had provided during
the rulemaking process, and in January 2009, a federal district court
enjoined the DOJ from putting the rule into effect "without first providing an additional comment period of at least thirty days and pub'6 1
lishing a response to any comments received during such period.
Citing this injunction, in February 2009, the DOJ announced its intention "to solicit further comment on all aspects of the final rule for 60
days. ' 62 For the present, then, it seems that no state currently qualifies for the fast-track procedures.
Nonetheless, it is instructive to contemplate how those procedures
would work should they take effect in an actual case. If a state qualified for the fast-track procedures and wished to apply those procedures to a particular capital defendant, a court would ordinarily enter
an order that appointed counsel for the defendant in the state collateral proceedings. 63 The prisoner's execution date would then be
stayed upon application to a federal habeas court. 64 This stay would
lapse if the prisoner failed to file a timely federal habeas petition;65 in
contrast to other federal habeas petitioners (who face a one-year statute of limitations), 66 fast-track capital petitioners must comply with
the statute's 180-day statute of limitations. 67 And even if the petitioner filed a timely federal petition, the statute directs that the stay of
execution "shall expire if ... [the petitioner] fails to make a substantial showing of the denial of a Federal right or is denied relief in the
district court or at any subsequent stage of review. ' 68 If such an event
occurred, the statute states that "no Federal court thereafter shall
have the authority to enter a stay of execution in the case, unless the
court of appeals approves the filing of a second or successive application under section 2244(b). '69 The statute also circumscribes the
60. See Office of the Attorney General; Certification Process for State Capital Counsel Systems, 73 Fed. Reg. 75,327, 75,327 (Dec. 11, 2008) (to be codified at 228 C.F.R. pt. 26).
61. Habeas Corpus Res. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. C 08-2649 CW, 2009 WL 185423, at
*10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2009).
62. Certification Process for State Capital Counsel Systems, 74 Fed. Reg. 6131, 6131 (Feb. 5,
2009) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 26).
63. See 28 U.S.C. § 2261(c) (2006).
64. See 28 U.S.C. § 2262(a) (2006).
65. See 28 U.S.C. § 2262(b)(1).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).
67. See 28 U.S.C. § 2263 (2006).
68. 28 U.S.C. § 2262(b)(3).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2262(c); see also 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS
CORPUS PRACrICE & PROCEDURE § 3.3c, at 144 n.64 (4th ed. 2001) (suggesting that this limita-

tion should be read narrowly in light of Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996)).
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scope of the federal habeas review, 70 and it sets a tight schedule for
the district court. As amended in 2006,71 the statute mandates that
the district court must reach final judgment "not later than 450 days
after the date on which the application is filed, or 60 days after the
date on which the case is submitted for decision, whichever is earlier."
The district court can extend the relevant period for an additional
thirty days, but only if it issues written findings that the delay is war72
ranted, taking into account certain statutorily specified factors.
AEDPA's fast-track procedures also set time limits for the court of
appeals. 73 The court of appeals must determine the appeal no later
than 120 days after the last brief is filed. 74 If rehearing or rehearing en
banc is sought, the court of appeals must decide whether to grant rehearing within thirty days after the last relevant filing-the petition
or, if one is required, the response. 75 And, if the court of appeals
grants rehearing, it must finally determine the case on rehearing no
76
later than 120 days after entering the order that granted rehearing.
With respect to each set of time limits, the statute explicitly provides for both enforcement and oversight. The state can enforce the
district court time limit by seeking a writ of mandamus from the court
of appeals, and the court of appeals "shall act on the petition for a writ
'77
of mandamus not later than 30 days after the filing of the petition.
The state can enforce the court of appeals time limit "by applying for
a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court. '78 In addition, the statute
requires the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to submit annual reports to Congress on compliance with these time limits
79
by both the district courts and the courts of appeals.
AEDPA's legislative history indicates that the idea of such time limits grew out of allegations concerning federal court delay in adjudicating habeas petitions by state capital prisoners. During legislative
70. See 28 U.S.C. § 2264 (2006).
71. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177,
§ 507(e), 120 Stat. 251 (2006). Prior to the 2006 amendment, § 2266(b)(1)(A) provided, "A district court shall render a final determination and enter a final judgment on any application for a
writ of habeas corpus brought under this chapter in a capital case not later than 180 days after
the date on which the application is filed." See Pub. L. 104-132, § 107(a), 110 Stat. 1224 (enacting original version of § 2266(b)(1)(A)).
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(1)(C) (2006).
73. See 28 U.S.C. § 2266(c)(1).
74. See 28 U.S.C. § 2266(c)(1)(A).
75. See 28 U.S.C. § 2266(c)(1)(B)(i).
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 2266(c)(1)(B)(ii).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(4)(B).
78. 28 U.S.C. § 2266(c)(4)(B).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(5), 2266(c)(5).
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hearings in the 1990s, supporters of time limits decried long delays in
the execution of state prisoners8 ° and asserted that time limits on federal habeas proceedings were an important way to address such delays. For instance, Nebraska's Attorney General testified that
"[f]ederal judges already have the tools to set prompt case progression
standards and hold defense counsel to them. All too frequently, this is
not done. That is why statutory Federal habeas corpus reform is
necessary." '
In the case of the PLRA, the time limits on court action form part
of Congress's effort to circumscribe the role of the federal courts in
overseeing prison conditions. In addition to setting various limits on
prisoner lawsuits generally, the PLRA also narrows the availability of
systemic injunctive relief. As amended by the PLRA, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a) bars federal courts from granting preliminary or permanent
injunctive relief concerning prison conditions unless the court finds
that the relief is narrowly tailored to remedy actual violations of federal rights and that the relief is the "least intrusive means necessary"
for that purpose. 82 In making those findings, the court is directed to
give "substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the
operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief. '83 The
statute sets additional strictures on orders that limit the size of a
prison population.8 4 Section 3626(b) provides for the termination of
existing injunctions. Under § 3626(b)(2), an injunction that was entered without the type of findings required by § 3626(a) is subject to
termination unless the court makes the required findings. Under
§ 3626(b)(1), even an injunction that was entered with the requisite
findings is subject to termination after two years unless the court determines that the basis for the required findings still exists.
Section 3626(e) contains a number of avenues through which the
institutions that are subject to a prison condition injunction can enforce § 3626(b)'s termination mechanism. Section 3626(e)(1) provides
that "[t]he court shall promptly rule on any motion to modify or terminate" the injunction, and that "[m]andamus shall lie to remedy any
80. See, e.g., FederalHabeasCorpus Reform: EliminatingPrisoners'Abuse of the JudicialProcess: Hearing on S. 623 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 58, 60 (1995) (statement of Gale A. Norton, Att'y Gen. of Colorado).
81. Id. at 64 (statement of Don Stenberg, Att'y Gen. of Nebraska); see also id. at 34 (statement of Dan Morales, Att'y Gen. of Texas) ("While many of the Federal district courts in Texas
expedite capital cases, it is not unusual for such cases to remain in the district court for five to
seven years.").
82. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A), (a)(2).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)-(2) (2006) (setting limits on "prospective relief" and "preliminary
injunctive relief," respectively).
84. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3) (setting preconditions for "prisoner release order[s]").
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failure to issue a prompt ruling on such a motion." 85 Even apart from

this, the remainder of § 3626(e) provides an automatic enforcement
mechanism. A motion to terminate injunctive relief under
§ 3626(b)(1) or (b)(2) automatically stays the existing injunction "beginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed."'86 As amended in
1997,87 the statute permits the court to "postpone the effective date
of" this stay "for good cause," but only for an additional sixty days. 8
The statute renders any order interfering with the automatic stay
(other than an order implementing the permitted sixty-day extension)
89
immediately appealable.

Proponents of the PLRA's limits on injunctive relief relied on a
number of contentions related to inmate litigation. 90 With respect to

structural-reform injunctions, bill proponents asserted that federal
judges were interfering with the administration of prisons, 91 making
prisons more costly to run 92 and endangering the public by requiring
"the release of dangerous criminals. '93 Accordingly, the bill's sponsors proposed to "curtail interference by the Federal courts ... in the
orderly administration of our prisons. ' 94 Opponents of the limits
warned that the bill would "strip Federal courts of the authority to
remedy unconstitutional prison conditions" and would constitute "a
85. The provision concerning mandamus was added in 1997. See Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470.
86. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2)(A)(i). If the motion to terminate is made under any authority
other than § 3626(b)(1) or (b)(2), the automatic stay comes into effect on the 180th day after
filing rather than the 30th day after filing. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2)(A)(ii).
87. See Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 123, 111 Stat.
2440, 2470.
88. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(3).
89. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(4).
90. For assessments of the assumptions underlying the PLRA, see, for example, Margo
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1692-93 (2003); Kermit Roosevelt III,
Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act: The Consequence of ProceduralError, 52
EMORY L.J. 1771, 1777 (2003).

91. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. 26,449 (1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham) (alluding to "consent decrees, such as those in Michigan under which judges control the prisons literally for
decades").
92. See, e.g., id. at 26,448-49 (statement of Sen. Abraham).
93. Id. at 26,448 (statement of Sen. Abraham) ("[I]n other jurisdictions, judicial orders entered under Federal law actually result in the release of dangerous criminals from prison."); see
also Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration:Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary,104th Cong. 51-52 (1995) [hereinafter July 1995 Hearing] (reproducing a resolution by the National District Attorneys Association).
94. 141 CONG. REc. 26,449 (1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham). For the views of an academic who supported enactment of the PLRA's curbs on prison-condition injunctions, see July
1995 Hearing,supra note 93, at 190 (responses to questions from Sen. Abraham to Professor
John J. Dilulio, Jr.).
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dangerous legislative incursion into the work of the judicial branch, 95
but their opposition ultimately failed.
In this context, an automatic stay provision was presented as a way
of ensuring that the federal courts ruled in a timely fashion on requests for termination of injunctive relief.96 As a House committee
report asserted, "[L]ocal officials are often handcuffed in their efforts
to modify or terminate unnecessary and burdensome consent decrees
[or] other orders by judge[s] who stonewall and simply refuse, for
many months or even years, to issue a ruling on a request for modification or termination. ' 97 During a House debate on a version of the
bill, Representative Melvin Watt proposed an amendment that would
delete the automatic stay, arguing that the automatic stay was an unprecedented, "radical change" that would burden "overcrowded,
overworked Federal courts. ' 98 Representative Charles Canady of
Florida responded that the stay "is simply a mechanism to encourage
the court to act swiftly, to consider these matters which are of great
public importance," and he intimated that judicial delay could endanger the public: "What happens in many of these cases involving prison
conditions is, the court, unfortunately, will not expeditiously consider
such motions for relief by the States and local governments. In some
cases, that can result in dangerous criminals actually being let out on
the street." 99 Representative Watt's proposed amendment failed by a
lopsided vote. 100
Unlike AEDPA's fast-track provisions, which as of this writing have
not yet been applied to any capital habeas petitioners, the PLRA's
timing provisions were soon tested. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits read
the PLRA to leave federal courts with equitable authority to lift the
automatic stay. 10 1 The Seventh Circuit found that the PLRA foreclosed such authority and held that the automatic stay provision vio10 2
lated separation of powers principles.
95. 142 CONG. REC. 5193 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see also id. at 5194 (statement
of Sen. Simon) ("History is replete with examples of egregious violations of prisoners' rights.").
96. Supporters of a time limit included the National District Attorneys Association. See
Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration:Hearing Before the S. Comm. on

the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 52 (1995).
97. H.R. REP. No. 104-21, at 26 (1995).
98. 141 CONG. REC. 4366 (1995).
99. 141 CONG. REC. 4367 (1995).
100. See 141 CONG. REc. 4368-69 (1995) (recording "ayes-93," "noes-313," "not voting28").
101. See Ruiz v. Johnson, 178 F.3d 385, 395 (5th Cir. 1999); Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925,
930 (6th Cir. 1998).
102. See French v. Duckworth, 178 F.3d 437, 447 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'd sub nom. Miller v.
French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
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In Miller v. French, the Supreme Court held that both of these approaches were erroneous. 10 3 The Miller Court first held that the Fifth
and Sixth Circuits' interpretations of the statute were insupportable:
"Any construction that preserved courts' equitable discretion to enjoin the automatic stay would effectively convert the PLRA's
mandatory stay into a discretionary one .... [T]his would be plainly
contrary to Congress' intent in enacting the stay provision . . . .104
Next, the Court held that the Seventh Circuit erred in holding that the
automatic stay offended separation of powers principles. 0 5 The
Court reasoned that § 3626(b)'s termination provisions are permissible alterations of the propriety of prospective relief, and that
§ 3626(e)'s automatic stay is a permissible way to effectuate the provisions of § 3626(b).106 Briefly focusing on the automatic stay's role as a
deadline for court action, the Court stated that it had "no occasion to
decide whether there could be a time constraint on judicial action that
was so severe that it implicated ... structural separation of powers
concerns. ' 10 7 As for the possibility that "the time is so short that it
deprives litigants of a meaningful opportunity to be heard," that question implicated due process concerns rather than separation of powers
principles and was outside of the scope of the question presented.10 8
The Court "le[ft] open, therefore, the question whether this time limit,
particularly in a complex case, may implicate due process
concerns."l 0 9
Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in the
majority's statutory analysis but not in its separation of powers analysis. In their view,
[I]f determining whether a new rule applies requires time (say, for
new factfinding) and if the statute provides insufficient time for a
court to make that determination before the statute invalidates an
extant remedial order, the application of the statute raises a serious
question whether Congress has in practical terms assumed the judicial function. 110
Justices Stephen Breyer and John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that
the PLRA should not be construed to remove all equitable authority
103. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341, 346, 350 (2000).
104. Id. at 341.
105. See id. at 346.
106. See id. ("[Section] 3626(e)(2) merely reflects the change implemented by § 3626(b),
which . . . establish[es] new standards for prospective relief.").
107. Id. at 350.
108. Id.

109. Id.
110. Id. at 352 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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to suspend the automatic stay. 1 ' The dissenters began by noting "the
extreme circumstances that at least some prison litigation originally
sought to correct, the complexity of the resulting judicial decrees, and
the potential difficulties arising out of the subsequent need to review
those decrees in order to make certain they follow Congress' PLRA
directives."' 1 2 While conceding that their interpretation might not be
"the most natural reading of the statute's language" and that some
legislators who voted for the PLRA would reject such an interpretation,113 the dissenters concluded that the PLRA,
when read in light of its language, structure, purpose, and history, is
open to an interpretation that would allow a court to modify or suspend the automatic stay when a party, in accordance with traditional equitable criteria, has demonstrated a need for such an
exception. That interpretation reflects this Court's historic reluctance to read a statute as depriving courts of their traditional equitable powers. It also
avoids constitutional difficulties that might arise
114
in unusual cases.
Time limits such as those set by AEDPA's fast-track provisions or
by the PLRA's automatic stay mechanism may have the effect of reordering the courts' priorities. Indeed, that is the intended effect of at
least one of these statutes. AEDPA's chapter on fast-track capital
habeas procedures includes a provision that states this goal explicitly:
"The adjudication of any application under section 2254 that is subject
to this chapter, and the adjudication of any motion under section 2255
by a person under sentence of death, shall be given priority by the
district court and by the court of appeals over all noncapital matters. 11 5 And both AEDPA and the PLRA, when authorizing limited
extensions of their time limits on district court action, explicitly rule
out, as a reason for extension, "general congestion of the court's
calendar."116

The Miller Court noted the possibility that, in some circumstances,
very tight deadlines for court action may not afford enough time for
111. Id. at 361 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 355 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 362 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I do not argue that this interpretation reflects the most natural reading of the statute's language. Nor do I assert that each
individual legislator would have endorsed that reading at the time.").
114. Id. at 361 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 2266(a).
116. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2266(b)(1)(C)(iii) (AEDPA fast-track provision), with 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(e)(3) (PLRA automatic stay provision). The PLRA language concerning court congestion was added in 1997. See Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105119, § 123, 111 Stat. 2440, 2470.
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thorough analysis of the merits of the relevant question. 117 In extreme
cases, as the Miller Court acknowledged, such enforced haste could
raise due process or even separation of powers concerns.' 1 8 Even
short of these concerns, however, tight deadlines may have significant
effects.
For example, the imposition of a tight deadline on decision making
can affect the content of the law. Another of AEDPA's time limits
provides an example. In habeas cases to which the fast-track procedures do not apply, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) sets stringent limits on the
petitioner's ability to bring a second or successive petition.1 19 Such a
petition can only be brought if the claim asserted in the petition meets
one of two strict statutory requirements-either that "the claim relies
on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailaI
ble, ' 120 or that
the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered
previously through the exercise of due diligence; and ...the facts
underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence
as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing
evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder
2
would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.'
Before filing a successive petition, the petitioner must seek permission
from the court of appeals.12 2 The court of appeals can grant this permission "only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie
showing that the application satisfies the requirements" set by
§ 2244(b),1 23 and it must rule on the question "not later than 30 days
1 24
after the filing of the motion.
In Tyler v. Cain, the Supreme Court interpreted § 2244(b)'s "new
rule" provision. 125 The Court held that the phrase "made retroactive
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court" means held retroactive.1 2 6 In other words, § 2244(b)'s "new rule" provision can only
apply if the Supreme Court "has held that the new rule is retroactively
117. See Miller, 530 U.S. at 350 ("leav[ing] open . . . the question whether [18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(e)(2)'s] time limit, particularly in a complex case, may implicate due process concerns,"
and not deciding "whether there could be a time constraint on judicial action that was so severe
that it implicated these structural separation of powers concerns").
118. See id.
119. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
120. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A).
121. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).
122. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C).
124. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D).
125. Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 656 (2001).
126. See id. at 662 (holding "that 'made' means 'held"').

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:601

applicable to cases on collateral review."'1 2 7 In addition to analyzing
the statute's wording, the Tyler majority relied on the timing of the
§ 2244(b) mechanism, holding that the Court's chosen "interpretation
is necessary for the proper implementation of the collateral review
128
structure created by AEDPA":
The court of appeals must make a decision on the application within
30 days. In this limited time, the court of appeals must determine
whether the application "makes a prima facie showing that [it] satisfies the [second habeas standard]." It is unlikely that a court of appeals could make such a determination in the allotted time if it had
to do more than simply rely on Supreme Court holdings on retroactivity. The stringent time limit thus suggests that the courts of appeals do not have to engage in the difficult legal analysis that can be
required 129to determine questions of retroactivity in the first
instance.
The imposition of short deadlines for court action also affects the
parties' litigation timetable, and it can thus alter the dynamics among
the litigants. For example, Margo Schlanger has argued that the
PLRA's automatic stay provision "accelerates the termination litigation in a way that sharply disadvantages plaintiffs" by requiring the
plaintiff who is defending the injunction to assemble potentially complex proof of the continuing need for the injunction within a very
130
short period of time.
Because deadlines on court action can have significant effects on
the court, the parties, and the development and application of the law,
it is important that the assessment of such deadlines be informed by
an accurate sense of litigation realities. A recent study of postAEDPA habeas practice in federal district courts, for instance, finds
that both noncapital and capital cases take longer post-AEDPA than
pre-AEDPA. This study concludes that "[g]iven how long capital
habeas cases presently take to resolve, the statutory 450-day time limit
for resolving capital habeas cases from states that may qualify for expedited review under AEDPA will pose a challenge for courts.' 31 In
the districts examined by that study, "the average processing time for
capital cases is well over two and a half times that long," and none of
127. Id. at 662.
128. Id. at 664.
129. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C)).
130. Margo Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison
Court Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550, 591-92 (2006).
131. NANCY J. KING ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE CTS. FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT:
HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICr COURTS 60 (2007), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij

grants/219559.pdf.
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the thirteen districts studied "completed its capital habeas cases in less
' 132
than 500 days on average, even excluding stayed time.

III.

COURTS, PARTIES, AND LAWYERS

The preceding Part noted that the creation and treatment of deadlines can reveal both how legislatures think about the courts and how
judges approach statutory deadlines.' 3 3 This Part examines the ways
in which the interpretation and application of deadlines can illuminate
judges' views of the roles of both litigants and lawyers. 134 The topics
are related; as noted in Part I.A, a litigant's noncompliance with a
deadline may sometimes have fatal consequences precisely because
the deadline in question is set by statute and is for that reason regarded as jurisdictional. 35 This Part, however, will consider the
broader question of deadlines in general. Section A notes the uncontroversial point that deadlines serve basic systemic needs; without
deadlines, no system of litigation could function. 136 Here, the classic
debate over rules and standards comes into play: a rational system will
often have rule-like time limits, but on occasion there is a value to
softening those rules through the application of a standard that permits tardiness to be forgiven. These standards for forgiveness are dis37
cussed in Section B.'
A.

Systemic Concerns

Deadlines serve key functions before, during, and after litigation.
Prior to litigation, a statute of limitations can spur the plaintiff to
bring suit at a time when relevant evidence still exists, witnesses'
memories are still fresh, and the defendant has not yet relied on the
absence of suit. After litigation commences, deadlines can keep the
case moving by setting the timeline for initial pleadings and motions,
discovery, dispositive pretrial motions, and the like. Once a case
reaches judgment, values of finality are served by the relatively tight
deadlines for making most postjudgment motions and for taking
appeals.
132. Id.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 22-132.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See
See
See
See

infra text accompanying notes
supra text accompanying note
infra text accompanying notes
infra text accompanying notes

138-189.
30.
138-147.
148-189.
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At each stage, deadlines might be softened to account for competing concerns. Statutes of limitations might be tolled. 138 The court

might extend the deadlines for various steps in the pretrial process. t 3 9
Timely filing of certain postjudgment motions tolls the time to take an
appeal.' 40 The time to appeal can be extended for limited periods or,
under certain circumstances, reopened. 14' Even after that time, the
142
trial court can be asked to grant relief from the judgment.

But all such extensions are subject to limits, and in some instances,
the values served by a deadline are seen to be so important that extensions are permitted only under special provisions-as is true for appeal time' 3 -or

4 4 It
not at all-as is true for postjudgment motions.1

should be noted that the more rule-like a time limit is, the more important it becomes to select a realistic time frame. Postjudgment motion deadlines are illustrative. The ten-day deadline previously set by
the Civil Rules-effectively fourteen days in most cases because intermediate weekends and holidays were omitted from the calculation 45-was widely thought to be too short for proper briefing of a
postjudgment motion in a complex case. 146 On at least some occasions, a sympathetic district judge, aware that extensions of the deadline were impermissible, delayed the entry of judgment so as to delay
the period for postjudgment motions. If one is to have a non-extendable deadline for postjudgment motions, the better choice is to select
a deadline that will be regarded as realistic. Happily, among the
amendments to the Civil Rules that took effect on December 1, 2009
138. See, e.g., Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990) (discussing examples
of equitable tolling).
139. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b) (authorizing courts to extend many civil litigation
deadlines).
140. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(4)(A) (providing that certain motions toll the time for taking
civil appeals); FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(3)(A) (providing that certain motions toll the time for taking
criminal appeals).
141. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5) (providing for extension of the time to take a civil appeal); 28
U.S.C. § 2107(c) (same); FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(6) (providing for reopening of the time to take a
civil appeal); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c) (same); FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(4) (providing for extension of the
time to take a criminal appeal).
142. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (providing grounds for relief from a civil judgment).
143. See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5) (providing for extension of the time to take a civil appeal), 28
U.S.C. § 2107(c) (same); FED. R. APP. P. 4(b)(4) (providing for extension of the time to take a
criminal appeal).
144. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) ("A court must not extend the time to act under Rules 50(b)
and (d), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), and 60(b).").
145. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6 (2009 Committee Note) (discussing the version of Civil Rule 6(a)
that was in effect prior to December 1, 2009).
146. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 50 (2009 Committee Note) ("Experience has proved that in
many cases it is not possible to prepare a satisfactory post-judgment motion in 10 days, even
under the former rule that excluded intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.").
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are amendments that changed the postjudgment motion deadlines in
147
Civil Rules 50, 52, and 59 from ten to twenty-eight days.

For many other deadlines, though, there is more play in the joints.
As discussed in the next Section, these deadlines can often be extended upon a showing of good cause or excusable neglect.
B.

Views of Lawyering

Although the details vary depending on the specific deadline, many
federal litigation deadlines can be extended if the litigant shows a
good enough reason. The standard for an extension ordinarily centers
on one or both of the terms "good cause" and "excusable neglect." In
applying the relevant standard, courts sometimes reveal assumptions
about the role of a lawyer and how a lawyer should act.
Civil Rule 6(b),'148 Criminal Rule 45(b), 14 9 Bankruptcy Rule
9006(b), 150 and Appellate Rule 26(b) 15 ' address such extensions.
These provisions have general application, but as noted above,1 52 they
exclude particular deadlines from their scope. 53 Among the dead-

lines to which Appellate Rule 26(b) does not extend are those for
147. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b), (d); 52(b); 59(b), (d)-(e).
148. The Civil Rules provide that
[w]hen an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good
cause, extend the time: (A) with or without motion or notice if the court acts, or if a
request is made, before the original time or its extension expires; or (B) on motion
made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.
FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1).

149. The Criminal Rules provide that
[w]hen an act must or may be done within a specified period, the court on its own may
extend the time, or for good cause may do so on a party's motion made: (A) before the
originally prescribed or previously extended time expires; or (B) after the time expires
if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(b)(1).

150. The Bankruptcy Rules provide that
[e]xcept as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of this subdivision, when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a
notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause shown may at any time
in its discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if the
request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as
extended by a previous order or (2) on motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(1).
151. "For good cause, the court may extend the time prescribed by these rules or by its order
to perform any act, or may permit an act to be done after that time expires." FED. R. APP. P.
26(b).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 143-144.
153. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2) ("A court must not extend the time to act under Rules 50(b)
and (d), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), and 60(b) .... "); FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(b)(2) ("The court may
not extend the time to take any action under Rule 35, except as stated in that rule."); FED. R.
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taking an appeal; extensions of such deadlines are addressed sepa1 54
rately, by Appellate Rule 4 (and sometimes by statute).
Under all of these Rules, including the appeal-time extension provisions in Appellate Rule 4, the court's analysis is likely to follow the
path marked by the Supreme Court in PioneerInvestment Services Co.
v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership.l5 5 Pioneer Investment
concerned a lawyer's failure to timely file a proof of claim in a bankruptcy proceeding, and it thus involved the interpretation of Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)'s "excusable neglect" standard, 15 6 but the lower
federal courts have also applied the Pioneer Investment approach to
15 7
the extension provisions in the Civil and Appellate Rules.
Under Pioneer Investment, the availability of an extension "is not
limited to situations where the failure to timely file is due to circumstances beyond the control of the filer"; 15 8 some "inadvertent or negli159
gent omission[s]" can qualify as well.
BANKR. P. 9006(b)(2) ("The court may not enlarge the time for taking action under Rules
1007(d), 2003(a) and (d), 7052, 9023, and 9024."). The Bankruptcy Rules provide that
[t]he court may enlarge the time for taking action under Rules 1006(b)(2), 1017(e),
3002(c), 4003(b), 4004(a), 4007(c), 4008(a), 8002, and 9033, only to the extent and
under the conditions stated in those rules. In addition, the court may enlarge the time
to file the statement required under Rule 1007(b)(7), and to file schedules and statements in a small business case under § 1116(3) of the Code, only to the extent and
under the conditions stated in Rule 1007(c).
FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(b)(3) (Supp. 2009). Similarly, the Appellate Rules provide that
the court may not extend the time to file: (1) a notice of appeal (except as authorized in
Rule 4) or a petition for permission to appeal; or (2) a notice of appeal from or a
petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, modify, enforce, or otherwise review an order of
an administrative agency, board, commission, or officer of the United States, unless
specifically authorized by law.
FED. R. App. P. 26(b).
154. Extensions of the civil appeals period are governed by Appellate Rule 4(a)(5) and 28
U.S.C. § 2107(c). These provisions permit an extension (through the later of "30 days after the
prescribed time or 10 days after the date" of entry of the order granting the motion) if, inter alia,
(i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a)
expires; and (ii) regardless of whether its motion is filed before or during the 30 days
after the time prescribed by this Rule 4(a) expires, that party shows excusable neglect
or good cause.
FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). Extensions of appeal time in criminal cases are governed by Appellate
Rule 4(b)(4). As to both civil and criminal appeals, authority to grant or deny extensions is
entrusted to the district court. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (civil appeals); 28 U.S.C. § 2107(c)
(same); FED. R. App. P. 4(b)(4) (criminal appeals).
155. 507 U.S. 380 (1993).
156. See id. at 382-83.
157. See, e.g., Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 860 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Pioneer Investment to the interpretation of Appellate Rule 4(a)(5)); Yesudian ex reL United States v. Howard
Univ., 270 F.3d 969, 971 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (applying Pioneer Investment to the interpretation of
Civil Rule 6(b)).
158. Pioneer Investment, 507 U.S. at 391.
159. Id. at 394-95.
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[T]he determination is at bottom an equitable one, taking account
of all relevant circumstances ...includ[ing] the danger of prejudice
to the [other litigants], the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including
whether it was within the reasonable control
of the movant, and
160
whether the movant acted in good faith.
The PioneerInvestment Court stressed that its decision did not undermine the enforcement of litigation deadlines. 16 1 Even though
some instances of attorney negligence might qualify for an extension,
it is always necessary to convince the court that the neglect is "excusable." "It is this requirement," the Court stated, "that we believe will
deter creditors or other parties from freely ignoring court-ordered
deadlines in the hopes of winning a permissive reprieve. '162 Clients,
moreover, cannot avoid the effects of their lawyers' failings simply by
arguing that they themselves were blameless. Lawyers act as agents
for their clients, and "clients must be held accountable for the acts and
1 63
omissions of their attorneys."'
At least under the circumstances of the PioneerInvestment case itself, the lawyer's personal circumstances did not weigh heavily with
the Court: the majority explicitly discounted "the fact that counsel was
experiencing upheaval in his law practice at the time of the bar
date."'1 64 It is possible, however, that this conclusion rested on the
Court's evaluation of the particular circumstances of the case. The
lawyer in PioneerInvestment had evidently been retained to represent
the relevant creditors roughly a month and a half before he withdrew
from his law firm, 6 5 so the Court might have reasoned that the withdrawal failed to provide a sufficiently strong excuse for the lawyer's
failure to ascertain and comply with the bar date. In cases in which a
lawyer's personal difficulties were more stark, courts have sometimes
been willing to recognize excusable neglect. The sudden, dire illness
66
of a solo practitioner, for example, has supported such a finding.'
160. Id. at 395.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 396. Of course, an exception to this principle exists in the criminal context when
defense counsel's performance is so deficient as to constitute ineffective assistance. See 16A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3950.9, at 489 (4th ed.
2008) ("[A]ttorney failures that result in an untimely appeal and that meet the test for constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel are ... grounds for relief even when the issue is raised
after the running of Rule 4(b)(4)'s permissible extension period.").
164. Pioneer Investment, 507 U.S. at 398.
165. See id. at 384.
166. See, e.g., Active Glass Corp. v. Architectural & Ornamental Iron Workers Local Union
580, 899 F. Supp. 1228, 1229, 1232 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (granting an extension of time to file a civil
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In Pioneer Investment, one factor that appeared to sway the majority was that the bar date was announced in a way that the Court believed would cause reasonable practitioners to overlook it: "[T]he
notice of the bar date provided by the Bankruptcy Court in this case
was outside the ordinary course in bankruptcy cases ....

[O]rdinarily

the bar date in a bankruptcy case should be prominently announced
and accompanied by an explanation of its significance." 167 Similarly,
in some cases, courts have been willing to excuse tardiness when the
failure to meet the deadline resulted from reliance on misinformation
provided by the court itself.168 It should be noted that-as discussed
above169 -some deadlines are jurisdictional, and failure to meet a jurisdictional deadline cannot be excused on the basis of the judicially
created "unique circumstances" doctrine (a doctrine that sometimes
has excused reliance on misinformation from the court).17 0 However,
reliance on misguidance from the court can nonetheless ground a finding of "excusable neglect" under the subdivisions of Appellate Rule 4
the apthat permit the district court to provide a limited extension of
7
peal deadline, even if that appeal deadline is jurisdictional.' '
Courts vary in their willingness to excuse a litigant for relying on
misinformation from the court, particularly when the misinformation
concerns a point of law that strikes the judge as obvious. A notable
case in point concerns the deadlines for tolling motions under the
Civil Rules. 172 Although it is well established that the district court
has no power to extend those deadlines, 173 both litigants and judges
sometimes overlook this fact. Thus, it is possible that a court might
find excusable neglect when a party, relying on a district court's purported extension of a tolling motion deadline, failed to timely file a
appeal when a solo practitioner was hospitalized with cancer, undergoing chemotherapy, and
unable to communicate by phone).
167. PioneerInvestment, 507 U.S. at 398.
168. See, for example, Mennen Co. v. Gillette Co., 719 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1983), stating
that
[t]he record does not appear to us to support an inference of procrastination, ineptitude
or dilatoriness on Mennen's part. Rather, it reflects good faith error by a party who
was deceived by a chain of unfortunate events upon which it was entitled to, and did,
rely. Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that
Mennen had failed to make a showing of excusable neglect so as to extend the time to
serve and file its notice of appeal.
169. See supra Part I.A.
,170. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
171. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 162, § 3950.3, at 295-96 (discussing extensions of the time
to take a civil appeal).
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 50(b), (d); 52(b); 59(b), (d)-(e),
173. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).
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notice of appeal. 174 Such a result is not, however, guaranteed; the
scorn with which some courts have viewed a litigant's failure to recognize the nonextendable nature of the tolling motion deadlines suggests
that a refusal to grant an appeal-time extension on that basis might
well be affirmed. Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. provides an
example. 175 In Prizevoits, the panel majority dismissed the appeal on
the ground that the district judge abused her discretion in extending
the time to appeal. 176 The core fact, for the majority, was how obvious it is that tolling motion deadlines are nonextendable:
Rule 6(b) makes plain .. .that the 10-day limit on filing a Rule
59(e) motion cannot be extended . . . . The federal rules are complex-a minefield for lawyers not experienced in federal practicebut Prizevoits' principal lawyer is a highly experienced federal litigator. He must know 177
about Rule 6(b). An unaccountable lapse is
not excusable neglect.
As Prizevoits demonstrates, some courts are unwilling to excuse
noncompliance with the federal rules even if the rules in question are
counterintuitive. A good example is provided by the treatment of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) during the period from 1979 to 1993, when it provided that the filing of a postjudgment motion permanently nullified
any prior notice of appeal. 178 This feature of Rule 4(a)(4) was so
counterintuitive-and so widely problematic-that the rulemakers
termed it a "trap for an unsuspecting litigant" and eliminated it.179
But prior to that amendment some courts refused to extend the appeal time when a litigant failed to realize that the postjudgment motion had nullified the prior notice of appeal. 80 On the other hand,
courts occasionally excuse a failure that results from a mistake of law.
It seems that this is most likely to occur if the litigant can convince the

174. See, e.g., Varhol v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1563 (7th Cir. 1990) (en
banc) (somewhat grudgingly holding the appeal timely where "[t]he trial judge found that
Varhol's failure to file a timely notice of appeal resulted from his reliance on the extension of
time to file the new trial motion and the consideration of that motion on the merits").
175. Prizevoits v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132 (7th Cir. 1996).
176. See id. at 135.
177. Id. at 133.
178. See WRGI-rT ET. AL., supra note 162, § 3950.4, at 322-24 (discussing the version of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4) that existed from 1979 to 1993).
179. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) (1993 Committee Note).
180. See Weinstock v. Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, 16 F.3d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1994)
("[T]he elimination of Rule 4(a)(4)'s 'trap' has come too late for Weinstock, and we are satisfied
that the District Court Judge did not exceed her discretion by not excusing Weinstock when he
fell into the trap.").
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court that any reasonable lawyer-or the judge herself-might com181
mit a similar error.
In this regard, it may be interesting to observe how courts treat mistakes that occur as a result of the transition to electronic filing.
Caselaw on this issue seems most likely to develop when district
courts permit the notice of appeal to be filed electronically and practitioners who are unfamiliar with electronic filing encounter difficulties.
The federal courts' Case Management/Electronic Case Filing (CM/
ECF) system is now in use in all ninety-four federal district courts, and
the courts of appeals are in the process of making the transition to
CM/ECF. 182 Some, though not all, district courts permit litigants to
file the notice of appeal electronically. 183
A recent case involving electronic filing in the Court of International Trade (CIT) illustrates the types of errors that might occur
when lawyers are not familiar with the electronic system. In that case,
an attorney waited until the last day of the appeal period before attempting to use the CIT's electronic filing website to file a notice of
appeal.' 84 He entered the requisite information and proffered payment, but because he logged off before reaching the final confirmation, the system did not record the filing. 18 5 He realized the mistake
the next day and reentered the filing, which was then duly recorded. 86
The Federal Circuit, remanding for the lower court to determine
whether to extend the appeal time, opined that these facts constituted
"a strong showing of excusable neglect.' 87 The CIT, on remand,
granted the extension. 188 It seems likely that the courts in this case
were swayed not only by the traps that electronic filing can pose for
new users, but also by the lawyer's diligence in double-checking the
following day whether the initial filing had worked. For lawyers, then,
cases such as this one illustrate both the perils of electronic filing and
181. See, e.g., Lorenzen v. Employees Ret. Plan of the Sperry & Hutchinson Co., Inc., 896
F.2d 228, 233 (7th Cir. 1990) (weighing, inter alia, the fact that "the error was a natural one").
182. See About CMJECF, http://www.uscourts.gov/cmecf/cmecfabout.html (last visited Jan.
19, 2010).
183. Compare, e.g., U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules E.D. Cal., CMIECF Procedures § C.17 ("A Notice of
Appeal should be filed electronically."), with U.S. Dist. Ct. Rules N.D. Cal., General Order 45,
pt. XI ("Until such time as the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the
Federal Circuit institute rules and procedures to accommodate Electronic Case Filing, notices of
appeal to those courts shall be filed, and fees paid, in the traditional manner on paper rather
than electronically.").
184. See Gilda Indus., Inc. v. United States, 511 F.3d 1348, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 1352.
188. See Gilda Industries, Inc. v. United States, 300 F. App'x. 912, 914, 2008 WL 5000238, at
*1 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (unpublished opinion) (noting the CIT's finding of excusable neglect).
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the need for diligence in double-checking one's compliance with key
deadlines.
These examples demonstrate that a judge's perspective on extension requests may well be shaped by the judge's views concerning the
capacities of lawyers. Just as legislators' imposition of deadlines on
court action should be informed by realistic perspectives concerning
the tasks of judging, 189 so too should judges' decisions concerning
whether to enforce a deadline be informed by a realistic sense of what
can and should be expected of lawyers.
IV.

LAWYERS' INTERACTIONS

Finally, litigation deadlines provide a context within which to observe the way that lawyers relate to each other, both within and
among firms, and both as adversaries and allies.
On the subject of the interaction among lawyers within a firm, one
might for example consider the role of junior lawyers. Amendments
to the national time computation rules took effect on December 1,
2009. One innovation in the amendments is a default rule that, for
filings made electronically, the last day of a period ends at midnight
rather than at the closing of the clerk's office. 190 This change may be
welcomed by litigators who thereby gain a few extra hours in a given
case; and the option of electronic filing can reduce cost and inconvenience. However, one predictable effect of this change is that, in
many instances, the lawyers' work will extend right up to the hour of
the filing deadline-and, at least in large law firms, the brunt of those
late nights may fall on the more junior lawyers on the team.
On the subject of interaction among lawyers representing different
parties, one obvious point is that many litigation deadlines can be and
often are extended by agreement of the parties. Lawyers' willingness
to agree to such extensions might provide one measure of the level of
professional courtesy within a given legal market. On the other hand,
mutual willingness to agree to extensions might sometimes pose systemic problems even if it benefits lawyers. This would be true, for
example, if the waiver of certain deadlines led to inordinate delays. 191
Such systemic concerns may explain why certain deadlines-such as
189. See supra text accompanying notes 131-132.
190. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(4).
191. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 29(b) ("[A] stipulation extending the time for any form of
discovery must have court approval if it would interfere with the time set for completing discovery, for hearing a motion, or for trial.").
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those for postjudgment motions-are simply not extendable, even if
192
all parties and the court prefer an extension.
On the other end of the spectrum, lawyers' qualms about uncooperative opponents surface when they discuss other aspects of litigation
deadlines. The "three-day rule" provides an example. Versions of
this rule exist in the Civil, Criminal, Bankruptcy, and Appellate
Rules. 193 Under the three-day rule, when a litigation deadline is measured from the service of papers on a litigant, three days are added to
the end of the period if the papers are served using certain specified
means, which include mail or electronic service. The three-day rule
originated in a time (before electronic service) when it was thought
fair to add the extra time in order to offset the time taken in the mail.
Now that electronic service is becoming the norm, a number of commentators have called for the revision or elimination of the three-day
rule. 194 But some practitioners defend the rule, particularly on the
ground that if it were eliminated, lawyers could disadvantage their opponent by, for example, serving papers electronically late on the eve195
ning before a holiday weekend.
Another example of the link between timing and lawyers' interactions can be found in Appellate Rule 29, which requires an amicus to
file its brief seven days after the filing of the brief of the party the
amicus supports.1 96 The idea behind the staggered timing is that the
amicus should review the party's brief so as to avoid duplicative arguments. 197 The provision of the seven-day time lag reflects the notion
that the amicus is an unbiased participant who is distanced from the
parties; in other words, the time lag rationale assumes that the amicus
will not have had the opportunity to review an advance copy of the
party's brief before it is filed. In practice, amici and the parties whose
positions they support often share drafts of their respective briefs.
192. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2).
193. See FED. R. Civ. P. 6(d); FED. R. CRIM. P. 45(c); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9006(f); FED. R.
App. P. 26(c).
194. See Minutes of the Judicizl Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure,
June 9-10, 2008, at 5.
195. Such timing problems can occur even under the current system. Professor Schlanger, for
example, has recounted her experience with motions under the PLRA's termination provision:
When I was a lawyer for the Department of Justice ... I recall that one state filed a
dozen such motions-one in each of its corrections cases-on July 3, and served them
by mail. The lead lawyer on the case in which I was involved did not open the motion
until after a long weekend and several days vacation, about a week later. On a thirtyday timeline, that lost week was very precious.
Schlanger, supra note 130, at 591 n.129.
196. See FED. R. App. P. 29(e).
197. See id. (1998 Committee Note).
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CONCLUSION

This brief and incomplete survey has not attempted to offer a unified theory of litigation deadlines. Rather, the goal of this Article is to
suggest that the treatment of deadlines is embedded in a network of
assumptions-by various actors in the system-about their own and
others' roles. Litigation deadlines are neither selected nor enforced in
a vacuum. The choice of a particular deadline may serve various
goals, such as protecting litigants, ensuring prompt case processing, or
safeguarding the finality of judgments. The interpretation and application of a deadline, statutory or otherwise, should take into account
its purposes. Judgments by legislators and courts concerning the timing of litigation can reveal underlying views about the nature of judging and lawyering. The more realistic those underlying views, the
better for the system.
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